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Abstract
Purpose – To examine whether Japanese commercial banks exhibited economies of scale and
economies of density at the time when the mega-merger wave in Japanese banking began in the late
1990s. Since this merger wave has not yielded efficiencies, this analysis aims to shed light on whether
banks, at the start of the wave, had reason to believe that larger banks would be more efficient.
Design/methodology/approach – Using a modified version of the translog cost function, the
analysis estimates economies of scale and economies of density for Japanese city banks, trust banks,
and regional banks. Then, the relationship between size and economies of scale/density and that
between profitability and scale/density are explored using regression analysis.
Findings – Results suggest that larger banks (as measured by value of assets/loans/
deposits/investments, and number of employees/branches) were more likely to be in the
decreasing/constant returns to scale/density region than smaller banks, The finding was
statistically significant for all three types of Japanese banks. On average, city banks exhibited
diseconomies of scale/density; trust banks exhibited constant returns to scale and increasing returns to
density, and regional banks exhibited increasing returns to scale and density. This suggests that
unions between city banks and either regional banks or trust banks may have been more likely to yield
cost-efficiencies, and raises questions concerning the efficiency motivations of the mega-bank mergers.
The findings further indicate that banks with higher sales were more likely to have exploited
scale/density efficiencies, and that banks with higher net incomes were more likely to be in the
increasing returns region.
Originality/value – This paper suggests that the mega-merger wave in Japan in the late 1990s may
not have been motivated by a desire for greater efficiencies through utilization of under-utilized branch
networks. Unlike other studies, this analysis differentiates between economies of scale and economies
of density.
Keywords Banking, Japan, Consolidation, Regression analysis
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The Japanese economy has been confronted with the need for substantive reform in a
variety of areas. Since the late 1990s, mergers and acquisitions have been frequent as
the Japanese economy tries to make a recovery. Various legal provisions have made
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M&A activity easier – revisions to the Commercial Code in 1997 simplified merger
reporting requirements and procedures, revisions to the antimonopoly laws in 1998
reduced the number of companies subject to the reporting requirements, and further
revisions to the Commercial Code in May, 2000 introduced mechanisms for corporate
spin-offs (Rafferty, 2000). Beginning in 1999, M&A activity increased substantially to
$152 billion in transaction value, relative to $7.9 billion in 1998 (Rafferty, 2000).
The M&A wave was particularly substantial in the banking sector, which
concentrated the assets of the banking industry into 5-6 major banking groups through
the mergers of “city banks”: the merger between Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank
was announced in October, 1999; the merger between Tokai Bank, Asahi Bank, and
Sanwa Bank was announced in March, 2000 (formed UFJ, which was the fourth largest
bank in Japan by 2004), the merger between the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and
Mitsubishi Trust was announced in April, 2000 (formed the Mitsubishi Tokyo
Financial Group, which was the second largest bank in Japan by 2004), the merger
between Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank, and IBJ was announced in August, 1999
(formed the Mizuho Financial Group, which is the largest bank in Japan), and the
merger between Mitsui Trust and Banking and Chuo Trust and Banking was
announced in January, 1999.
The stated rationale behind these large bank mergers announced during 1999-2000
at the time was that “bigger is better”. It is unclear if the banks considered “bigger is
better” to mean that larger banks created from the merger would be more likely to be
efficient in achieving economies of scale and economies of density. The press
surrounding the mergers suggested a different conception of “bigger is better” in that
the creation of bigger banks through mergers would enable the larger banks to:
strengthen their balance sheets since banks which merged would be eligible for more
government funds (Wall Street Journal, 1999); and be less small and vulnerable in
facing competitors in the wake of the banking consolidation wave in the US and
Europe (Wall Street Journal, 1999).
These benefits from “bigger is better” did not necessarily imply that the bigger
banks created from the merger would be more likely to have exploited economies of
scale or economies of density by more efficiently using their physical branch networks.
Recent articles have suggested that the Japanese bank mergers that occurred during
1999-2000 have largely failed. For example, The Economist (2000), noted that “Many of
these [bank] mergers have been less than successful, essentially just lumping together
banks without solving their underlying problems” (The Economist, 2000). Indeed, a
recent Wall Street Journal (2004), in discussing the effects of the formation of the
Mizuho Financial Group, noted that “Much of the initial motivation for the deal came
not from the banks themselves, but from the government, which was pushing hard to
consolidate Japans big lenders in the midst of a bad loan crisis . . . .Artfully designed to
look like a merger of equals, the chief executives of the three founding banks all shared
that title in the new company, while three corporate units were run by executives from
each of the founding companies. For three years, the banks even kept three computer
systems run by three separate contractors” (Wall Street Journal, 2004).
It is unclear whether the megabanks intended to become operationally efficient
when they were initially formed. This raises the question if these bank merger
candidates had reason to believe at the time of the merger, that larger banks tended to




economies of density. The purpose of this study is to determine whether, as of
1998-1999 when the Japanese banking merger wave began, larger banks in Japan were
more efficient than smaller banks and whether these efficiencies were mapped into
higher profitability.
The issue is particularly important in the current Japanese banking landscape as the
debate continues over whether bank mergers producing larger banks are beneficial
because “bigger is better” or because there would be synergies from creating a larger
bank which could lead to greater exploitation of economies of scale and economies of
density. This was most recently seen during the fall of 2004 in the debate over whether
UFJ (Japan’s fourth largest bank) should be taken over by Sumitomo Mitsui (Japan’s
third largest bank) or Mitsubishi Tokyo (Japan’s second largest bank). Regardless of
which of the two banks combined with UFJ, the combined entity would be the world’s
largest lender (by assets), and would exceed both Citigroup ($1.3 trillion) and the
Mizuho Financial Group in size (the combined assets of UFJ-Sumitomo Mitsui would be
$1.64 trillion and the combined assets of UFJ – Mitsubishi-Tokyo would be $1.7
trillion) (New York Times, 2004). The proposed merger between Mitsubishi Tokyo and
UFJ highlights the idea that “bigger is better” – Mitsubishi Tokyo makes half of its
loans to companies, while UFJ issues two-thirds of its loans to small and medium-sized
companies and individuals. About three-quarters of Mitsubishi Tokyo’s branches are
in eastern Japan (including Tokyo), while two-thirds of UFJ’s branches are in central
and western Japan. There are few opportunities for reducing duplicative branches or
pushing more products through underutilized branches to achieve economies of scale
or density. Rather, the larger combined bank would be more likely to achieve greater
revenues by adding the revenues from the disparate regions and client bases together
(Barrons, 2004). On the other hand, the proposed merger between the Sumitomo Mitsui
Group and UFJ highlights the possibility of achieving economies of scale and density
since both banks are strong in retail and small business lending, and have branch
networks in Osaka and Nagoya (The Economist, 2004). Underutilized branches can
either be closed, or additional products can be pushed through them; duplicative
branches can be reduced.
An understanding of the role of size and bank type on cost efficiency can assist in
developing constructive strategies. A number of studies in the literature have
examined cost efficiencies in the banking sectors in different geographic areas; surveys
can be found in Saunders and Cornett (2002) and Berger and Humphrey (1997). Some
examples of studies examining cost efficiencies in US and/or Canadian banks include:
Benston et al. (1982), Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987), Doukas and Switzer (1991),
McAllister and McManus (1993), Berger (1993), and Berger et al. (1997). Examples of
studies examining cost efficiencies in European banks include: Fanjul and Maravall
(1985), Rodriguez et al. (1993), Gathon and Grosjean (1991), McKillop et al. (1996),
Zardkoohi and Kolari (1994), and Vander Vennet (1996).
There are few studies which focus on banking efficiency in Japan. McKillop et al.
(1996) examined scale efficiencies for the five largest Japanese banks (city banks)
during 1978-1991 and found increasing returns to scale during the period, and then
constant returns from the late 1980s until 1991. Fukuyama (1993), using a
cross-sectional dataset over 1990-1991, found constant returns to scale for the
majority of the larger city banks. Nevertheless, Batchelor et al. (2000), using data





Altunbas et al. (2000) found evidence of diseconomies of scale for the larger Japanese
banks. The results of this analysis, as will be discussed in the subsequent sections,
suggest that large city banks exhibit diseconomies of scale, which is consistent with
the hypothesis that, over time, as city banks became larger, they became less efficient.
This analysis examines the impact of size and bank type (city banks, trust banks, or
regional banks) on cost-efficiency and profitability to determine whether larger banks
were manifesting cost efficiencies at the time that the merger wave in Japanese
banking started. The analysis differs from earlier studies in that it uses more recent
data (1998-1999), emphasizes both bank type-specific and cross-sectional results to a
greater degree than some of the other studies, and differentiates between economies of
scale and economies of density.
The results of the analysis suggest that larger banks tend to be in the diseconomies
region relative to smaller banks, which tend to be in the increasing returns region. This
finding is supported not only by Japanese banking studies, but also by European
studies. In Allen and Rai’s (1996) cross-country piece on Europe, they found scale
economies only for the smallest banks, with constant returns thereafter, and
diseconomies for the largest bank. The European Commission (1997) used
cross-sectional data on Europe and found increasing returns to scale for the small
banks. Fanjul and Maravall (1985) and Rodriguez et al. (1993) did single country
studies on Spain and found evidence of scale economies for medium-sized banks in
Spain, and diseconomies for the larger institutions. Similarly, Gathon and Grosjean
(1991) did a single country study for Belgium and found evidence of scale economies
for small Belgian institutions and diseconomies of scale as size increased. Hensel (2003)
cross-sectional analysis on European banking during 1998-1999 found similar results
for banks in that smaller banks, especially regional banks, were in the increasing
returns region. Unlike Japan, however, the largest European banks were in the constant
returns region, rather than the decreasing returns region. The empirical findings in this
study suggest that it is unlikely that the mega-mergers between large Japanese city
banks were motivated by efficiencies from improved branch network utilization and
rather may have been motivated by market power or a desire to become “too big to
fail”.
The paper is organized in several sections. Section 2 provides some background on
the Japanese banking sector, discusses the data, and presents summary statistics on
the various bank types. The model and methodology are developed in section 3, while
section 4 describes the empirical findings and discusses the explanations behind them.
Section 5 concludes by summarizing the main empirical findings and describing the
various policy implications suggested by them.
2. Background on the Japanese banking sector and data
The Japanese banking sector[1] has traditionally been highly concentrated with high
barriers to entry. At the beginning of the last decade, there were 21 “large” banks – 11
city banks, seven trust banks, and three long-term credit banks – which jointly
controlled 73 percent of banking assets in Japan. By 2000, two had failed and/or been
nationalized, and five of the remaining 17 banks had merged into two new entities
(Friedman, 2000). The data, which are from OneSource Financial and Thomson/Polk’s
Banking Directory, consist of balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow measures




These data cover the Japanese banking industry well because there were only nine city
banks, 121 regional banks, and six trust banks as of 2000.
Traditionally, the city banks served large corporations, rather than individual
depositors, but as the financial markets developed as alternative sources of capital, city
banks began servicing smaller companies and, in the 1980s, began expanding
internationally. The city banks have extensive branch networks stretching throughout
the country, although their name derives from their offices in all the major cities. The
six trust banks do both banking and trust management (asset management). They
have a strong metropolitan presence and an extensive corporate clientele. The 121
regional banks have branch networks concentrated in a particular prefecture and
engage in relationship-lending to local small and medium-size businesses and local
depositors. They lack the diversity of products, the extensive metropolitan presence,
and the close relationships with large companies that the city banks and trust banks
have. Regional banks tend to differentiate themselves through geographic location and
spatial convenience, rather than through product diversity and hence are
monopolistically competitive within their prefectures (depending on the degree of
concentration). Trust banks and city banks, due to their smaller number, reflect a more
oligopolistic market structure. The stronger regional banks have capital adequacy
ratios equal to those of the city banks, and, unlike some of the larger city banks, have
fewer public funds in their capital base. Regional banks have reduced exposure to the
larger problem borrowers because they lend much less to them relative to the larger
city banks (The Economist, 2002).
Basic summary statistics for the three types of banks and the overall sample are in
Table I. On average, city banks, relative to trust banks and regional banks have the
greatest number of employees and the greatest number of domestic and foreign offices.
City banks have substantial volumes going through their branches and, consequently,
high per branch profitability. For example, city banks have the highest value of
deposits and loans per branch– deposits and loans per branch at city banks are five to
six times higher than they are at regional banks. Due to their heavy involvement in
asset management, trust banks have the highest value of investments per branch[2].
Sales per branch at city banks are eight times higher than at regional banks and net
income per branch is 14 times greater than at regional banks[3].
The higher per branch volume of city banks and trust banks, relative to regional
banks, results in higher overhead costs. City banks, closely followed by trust banks,
have the most elaborate, and costly offices; indeed, property, plant, and equipment
(PPE) per branch is almost five times greater at city banks than at regional banks,
although they have only twice the number of employees per branch of regional banks,
and about half the number of employees per branch for trust banks. Overhead
expenses per employee for city banks and trust banks are almost twice those for
regional banks. The high overhead expenses for city banks are a function of the
diversity of products, corporate client emphasis, and, possibly, managerial
inefficiencies. Regional banks have lower overhead costs which is a function of the
simplicity of their traditional role[4].
3. Methodology
The model in this paper is based on a modified version of Jorgenson, Christensen, and





The translog cost function has been used to estimate scale economies in a number of
different banking studies, beginning with Benston et al. (1982)[5]. Examples of banking
studies using the translog cost function to examine banking efficiency include: Doukas
and Switzer’s (1991) analysis of Canadian banks, Zardkoohi and Kolari’s (1994) study
on Finnish banks, and Pavlopoulos and Kouzelis (1989) analysis of Greek banks. This
particular variant of the translog is different from other models in that it includes







Number of banks 103 7 89 6
Output and infrastructure measures
Average number of employees 3,112 13,455 2,190 4,391
Average value of loans 33,824 238,032 16,575 40,955
Average value of deposits 35,977 24,290 19,724 38,509
Average value of investments 9,010 61,912 3,995 20,180
Average number of domestic offices 125 315 114 65
Average number of foreign offices 3 30 1 6
Average number of total offices 128 345 115 71
Branch office utilization measures
Average PPE per office 5.1985 16.846 3.5719 15.781
Average deposits per office 214.31 688.32 156.14 529.48
Average loans per office 201.95 668.4 131.31 582.73
Average investments per office 56.632 177.07 31.112 275.08
Average employees per office 22.864 39.065 18.532 63.659
Income and expenses per branch measures
Average non-interest expense per branch 4.650 13.95 2.969 18.38
Average sales per branch 10.44 39.76 5.259 49.41
Average net income per branch 22.369 13.95 20.580 222.63
Input prices
Average price of deposits (interest
expense/deposits)
0.0111 0.0259 0.0069 0.0398
Average price of loans (loan loss
provisions/loans)
0.0138 0.0119 0.01223 0.0398
Average price of overhead (overhead
expenses/employees)
0.1768 0.3511 0.1564 0.2823
Income and expense measures
Average interest expense 715.09 6,936 148.60 1,641.2
Average non-interest expense 730.88 4,820.5 370.01 1,317.6
Average loan loss provision 478.93 3,003.3 213.27 1,403.1
Average interest income 1,341.5 10,927.3 518.28 2,059.4
Commission and fee income (OBS activities) 142.57 1,183.7 53.653 248.37
Note: This Table shows the summary statistics for all the city banks, trust banks, and regional
banks in the analysis during 1998-1999, the period covered by the study. The data, which are in
millions of US dollars, are from the international database OneSource Financial, and come from the









(2003). This enables a distinction between economies of scale and economies of density,
originally introduced in Caves et al.’s (1984) study on railroad productivity.
Economies of density are cost efficiencies from undertaking more transactions
within a given branch network, holding the number of branches fixed, and measures
the utilization of a branch network. Economies of scale are cost efficiencies from
undertaking more transactions within a given branch network, and expanding the size
of the network. These two measures help to determine whether a bank should
undertake more transactions within its existing branch network (are there increasing
returns to density?) or whether it should build more branches to undertake the greater
volume of transactions (are there increasing returns to scale?)
This functional form provided several advantages over other methodologies. First,
unlike the Cobb-Douglas function, it does not make assumptions involving constant
returns to scale or input cost elasticities. Second, it provides point estimates of
efficiency for each bank using cross-sectional data – parametric approaches such as
thick frontier analysis would not provide estimates for particular banks, while
distribution free analysis would provide estimates of average efficiency over time and
could only be used for panel data, not cross-sectional data. Given the regulatory
changes in the Japanese banking sector, as well as bank consolidation and failure,
cross-sectional data was more appropriate for this period. Third, in parametric
approaches such as stochastic frontier analysis, the more flexible the distributional
assumptions placed on the inefficiency component of the error term for the specified
cost function, the harder it is to disentangle the inefficiency component of the error
term from the random error component of the error term. Fourth, nonparametric
approaches, such as data envelope analysis, assume that there is no random
component affecting the performance of the firm. A more full discussion of the various
methodologies can be found in Goddard et al. (2001). Fifth, none of the alternative
methodologies provide a distinction between density and scale measures of efficiency.
Although, as discussed in McAllister and McManus (1993), the translog can have
distortions away from the mean product mix in some datasets, its advantages for the
purpose of this study are significant.
The basic form of the translog (equation 1) used in this analysis appears below with
the input prices, outputs, and the variables representing the branch network (number
of branches) entering linearly, quadratically, and interacted with each other. Y
represents output, P represents the input price, B represents the number of branches,
and S represents the share of the input cost in total cost. Equation 2 provides the
functional form of the associated cost share equations, which are derived by
differentiating the translog cost function by the natural log of price using Shepard’s
Lemma[6]:
lnC ¼ lna0 þ
X
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The model used three outputs and three inputs. Loans, deposits, and investments were
used as output (Y) measures, thus following the “value-added” rather than the
“intermediation” approach in including deposits as an output. This follows other
banking efficiency estimation studies which used the “value-added” approach, such as
Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996) and Jagtiani et al. (1995). The likelihood ratio test between
the unrestricted model including deposits and the restricted model without deposits
confirmed the importance of deposit inclusion in modeling through the “value added”
approach for this data – Chi2 (9) was 175.68 with a p-value of 0.0000[7]. Inclusion of
deposits as an output, and inclusion of the interest paid on deposits as an input cost (as
will subsequently be discussed) recognizes the dual nature of deposits, which have both
input and output characteristics, and follows other efficiency studies, such as Jagtiani
and Khanthavit (1996), Jagtiani et al. (1995), Berger and Humphrey (1991), and Bauer et al.
(1993). This modeling recognizes that deposits, as an output, are associated with various
services provided by banks to depositors, involving aspects of payment, safe protection
of depositor funds, and liquidity. Deposits have the characteristics of an input in that the
funds raised through deposits enable banks to lend further, and in that banks pay for
these funds through the interest on deposits received by customers[8].
Some output specifications in the banking efficiency literature have included
off-balance sheet (OBS) items as an output. This analysis does not include OBS as an
output because although a few of the large city banks and trust banks in the late 1990s
were involved in OBS activities, most of the other banks in the sample were not. Using
commissions and fee income as a proxy for OBS, the last line of Table I shows the low
level of OBS activities relative to other sources of income during the period of the analysis
across all three types of banks, as well as that the role of regional banks in OBS activities
was very small – OBS activities were 22 times greater in city banks than regional banks
and 4.6 times greater in the trust banks than the regional banks. When comparing the
unrestricted model including OBS activities as an output, and the restricted model
without OBS activities, the likelihood ratio test confirmed the unimportance of OBS
inclusion in modeling – Chi2(10) was 10.14 with a p-value of 0.4279. Finally, the scale and
density estimates generated using a model including OBS as an output were not
significantly different from the estimates generated using a model excluding OBS.
The input costs – the P’s– included: the price of deposits (interest expense divided
by deposits), the price of loans (loan loss provisions divided by loans), and the price of
overhead (physical capital and salary expenses divided by employees). This is similar
to the input price specifications used in other banking efficiency studies, such as
Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996), Jagtiani et al. (1995), and Schaffer (1993). The data did
not allow for a more detailed breakdown of outputs or input prices; consequently,
wages and PPE costs are combined into the price of overhead variable. The model also
included branch variables, which were the sum of the total number of offices.
The basic translog cost function (equation 1) was estimated together with the
associated cost share equations (equation 2 shows the functional form of the cost share
equations) and symmetry and homogeneity conditions were imposed. To get a
nonsingular system, one of the share equations was dropped, so the model was estimated
using Zellner’s iterated SUR methodology to obtain results which are asymptotically
equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation, and hence invariant with respect to the
share equation deleted. In addition, I ran Breusch-Pagan tests of independence for each




Following Caves et al. (1984), estimates of returns to density for total output are
estimated as the sum of the elasticity of cost with respect to each output. When the sum
of these elasticities is less than one, then there are increasing returns to density; when it
is greater than one, then there are decreasing returns to density. Estimates of returns to
scale for total output are estimated as the sum of not only the elasticity of cost with
respect to each output, but also the elasticity of cost with respect to branch. This is
because the number of branches is held fixed in density measurements, but allowed to
vary in scale measurements.
The model does not include dummy variables for each type of bank because they
did not improve the fit of the model. The likelihood ratio test of the model with city
bank and trust bank dummies versus no dummies yielded a chi2 statistic of 1.17, with
a p-value of 0.5557. The likelihood ratio test of the model with city bank and regional
bank dummies versus no dummies yielded a chi2 statistic of 1.42, with a p-value of
0.4914. The likelihood ratio test of the model with regional bank and trust bank
dummies versus no dummies yielded a chi2 statistic of 1.30, with a p-value of 0.5227.
4. Empirical findings
The empirical evidence indicates that larger banks are more likely to have exhausted
opportunities for scale and density efficiencies than smaller banks during 1998-1999,
across the sample and within each bank type, immediately prior to the wave of mergers
leading to the formation of megabanks. Point estimates of economies of scale and
economies of density for each bank in the dataset were calculated using the parameter
estimates from the estimated form of the translog cost function, which are in Table II.
Table III shows the parameter estimates of the associated cost share equations, which
were estimated together with the translog cost function.
The averages of the point estimates of economies of scale and economies of density for
the sample overall and for each type of bank (city banks, trust banks, and regional banks)
are found in Table IV. The overall sample of 103 banks exhibited increasing returns to
scale and density, on average, indicating further opportunities to exploit cost efficiencies
from pushing more output through the existing branch networks and from expanding the
branch network. Nevertheless, this result was driven by the estimates for the 89 regional
banks in the sample, which demonstrated substantial increasing returns to scale and
density. The six trust banks on average experienced constant returns to scale and
increasing returns to density; this suggests that they had underused capacity and could
have achieved cost efficiencies by pushing more output through their existing branches,
but that building new branches would not have generated further efficiencies, given the
cost of opening new branches (refer to Table I) relative to the volumes. The seven city
banks, many of whom were involved in merging with each other during the merger wave,
exhibited substantial diseconomies of scale and density. This suggests that they had
reached capacity within their existing branch networks (diseconomies of density), but that
significant overhead costs of opening new branches and existing branches (refer to
Table I) were yielding diseconomies of scale. City banks were inefficiently big prior to the
merger wave, so it is not surprising that mergers between them have failed to yield
efficiencies in the absence of branch consolidation. The result that the larger city banks on
average were in the decreasing returns to scale region by 1998-1999 is consistent with the
theory that city banks, as they became larger over time, became less efficient, as discussed





The relationship between cost efficiencies (economies of scale and density) and various
measures of profitability (and size) can be seen in the correlations between the point
estimates of scale/density and assets, sales, and net income in Table V. The high
positive correlations between scale/density and assets for the sample overall, and
within each bank type suggest that larger banks, as measured by assets, are more
likely to have higher scale and density estimates (i.e. are more likely to be in the
constant or decreasing returns to scale and density region). The numbers in
parenthesis are the p-values of significance tests, and indicate that all of these
correlations are statistically signficant. Banks with higher sales are more likely to have
higher scale and density estimates; again, this can be seen across the total sample, as
well as within each bank type. The data suggest a negative relationship between net
income and scale/density – i.e. more profitable banks (with a higher net income) are
more likely to be exhibiting increasing returns to scale/density. This relationship is
statistically significant for regional banks, but not for trust banks or city banks.
Coefficient Parameter estimate Standard error p-value
ln (loans) 0.3634 0.0540 0.000
ln (deposits) 0.3849 0.0630 0.000
ln (investments) 0.0827 0.0262 0.002
ln (branches) 0.0741 0.0204 0.015
ln (price of deposits) 0.2744 0.0030 0.000
ln (price of loans) 0.3139 0.0047 0.000
ln (loans) * ln(deposits) 20.1836 0.1159 0.113
ln (loans) *ln(investments) 0.5146 0.1212 0.671
ln (deposits) *ln(investments) 20.1401 0.2015 0.487
ln (loans) *ln(branches) 0.2107 0.1310 0.108
ln (deposits) *ln(branches) 20.1111 0.1893 0.557
ln (investments) *ln (branches) 20.6656 0.0972 0.494
ln (price of deposits)2 0.1708 0.0046 0.000
ln (price of loans)2 0.1849 0.0040 0.000
ln (loans)2 20.0248 0.2202 0.910
ln (deposits)2 0.5119 0.2188 0.019
ln (investments)2 0.0965 0.0708 0.173
ln (branches)2 20.1336 0.1126 0.235
ln (price of deposits) * ln (price of loans) 20.0751 0.0126 0.000
ln (price of deposits) * ln (deposits) 0.1502 0.0151 0.000
ln (price of deposits) * ln (investments) 20.0179 0.0072 0.013
ln (price of deposits) * ln (loans) 20.0564 0.0027 0.000
ln (price of loans) * ln (loans) 0.0899 0.0155 0.000
ln (price of loans) * ln (deposits) 20.0268 0.0204 0.189
ln (price of loans) * ln (investments) 20.0260 0.0094 0.006
ln (price of deposits) * ln (branches) 20.0139 0.0108 0.201
ln (price of loans) * ln (branches) 20.0171 0.0151 0.257
Constant 20.2522 0.0110 0.000
Note: This Table shows the parameter estimates for the specified translog cost function used in this
analysis. Estimates of returns to scale and returns to density are derived from these parameter
estimates. Note that this translog cost function was estimated with its associated cost share equations,







The relationship between cost efficiencies (economies of scale and density) and these
measures of size and profitability (assets, sales, and net income) are estimated in a
different way in Tables VI-VIII; the findings, however, confirm the statistically
signficant positive relationship between assets and scale/density in Table V. Table VI
estimates two models: the first model estimates economies of scale as a function of
assets, dummy variables for each type of bank, and interaction terms between assets and
the dummy variables. The specification in Table VI indicates a positive and statistically
significant relation between assets and scale for all three types of banks – for trust
banks, an increase in assets by 1 unit would increase the scale estimates by the sum of
Mean Standard deviation
Total sample returns to scale 0.5035 0.5528
Returns to density 0.4083 0.6402
City banks returns to scale 1.8667 0.2685
Returns to density 1.972 0.3085
Trust banks returns to scale 0.9157 0.7034
Returns to density 0.6858 0.8201
Regional banks returns to scale 0.3659 0.3769
Returns to density 0.2667 0.4586
Note: This Table shows averages (and standard deviations) of the point estimates of returns to scale
and returns to density for the overall sample, and for each type of bank (city banks, trust banks, and
regional banks), using the parameter estimates from the translog cost function in Table II, which was
estimated along with the cost share equations in Table III
Table IV.
Estimates of returns to
scale and returns to
density across bank types
and within types
Coefficient Parameter estimate Standard error P-value
First cost share equation:
ln (loans) 20.0751 0.0126 0.000
ln (deposits) 0.1502 0.0151 0.000
ln (investments) 20.0179 0.0072 0.013
ln (branches) 20.0139 0.0108 0.201
ln (cost of deposits) 0.1708 0.0046 0.000
ln (cost of loans) 20.0564 0.0027 0.000
Constant 0.2745 0.0030 0.000
Second cost share equation:
ln (loans) 0.0899 0.0155 0.000
ln (deposits) 20.0268 0.0204 0.189
ln (investments) 20.0260 0.0094 0.006
ln (branches) 20.0171 0.0152 0.257
ln (cost of deposits) 20.0564 0.0027 0.000
ln (cost of loans) 0.1850 0.0041 0.000
Constant 0.3139 0.0042 0.000
Note: This Table shows the parameter estimates of the associated cost share equations, which were
jointly estimated with the translog cost function in Table II. The parameter estimates for the translog











Assets Sales Net income
Total sample ðn ¼ 103Þ scale 0.782 (0.0000) 0.758 (0.0000) 20.675 (0.0000)
Density 0.764 (0.0000) 0.734 (0.0000) 20.631 (0.0000)
City banks ðn ¼ 7Þ scale 0.953 (0.0009) 0.933 (0.0022) 20.282 (0.5400)
Density 0.934 (0.0020) 0.903 (0.0054) 20.294 (0.5218)
Regional banks ðn ¼ 89Þ scale 0.913 (0.0000) 0.843 (0.0000) 20.321 (0.0022)
Density 0.902 (0.0000) 0.827 (0.0000) 20.275 (0.0091)
Trust banks ðn ¼ 6Þ scale 0.883 (0.0199) 0.803 (0.0545) 20.288 (0.5806)
Density 0.841 (0.0358) 0.764 (0.0768) 20.212 (0.6862)
Note: This Table shows the correlations of various measures of size (assets) and profitability (sales,
net income) with estimates for returns to scale and returns to density. The p-values from significance
tests for each of the correlations is in parentheses next to the correlation estimate and is in italics. The
correlations between size/profitability with scale/density are done for the sample overall, then only for
city banks, only for regional banks, and only for trust banks
Table V.
Correlations of assets,
sales, and net income
with economies of scale
and economies of density
Model I Model II
Parameter estimate Parameter estimate




p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Assets 2.23e-06 2.81e-06
(3.74e-07) (4.98e-07)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Trust bank dummy 20.9737 21.1623
(0.1949) (0.2595)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Regional bank dummy 21.0921 21.1448
(0.1429) (0.1902)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Assets * trust bank 1.03e-05 1.11e-05
(1.65e-06) (2.19e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Assets * regional bank 1.91e-05 2.28e-05
(1.23e-06) (1.64e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Notes: This Table estimates returns to scale as a function of assets, dummy variables for each type of
bank, and interaction terms between assets and bank-type dummy variables (model I) and estimates
returns to density as a function of the same variables (model II). Parameter estimates for each
coefficient are shown, along with their standard error in parentheses and p-value. The regression
specification provides an alternative method to using the correlations in Table V to determine the
relationship between scale efficiencies/density efficiencies and size, within each bank type and across
bank types. Model I: Estimate of returns to scale ¼ aþ b1 (assets) þ b2(trust bank) þ b3 (regional
bank) þ b4 (assets * trust bank) þ b5 (assets * regional bank). Adj R-square: 0.8970. Model II:
Estimate of returns to density ¼ aþ b1 (assets) þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3 (regional bank) þ b4 (assets
* trust bank) þ b5 (assets * regional bank). Adj. R-square: 0.8639
Table VI.
Regressions of economies
of scale and density on





the coefficient for assets (2.23e-06) and the coefficient for the interaction term between
trust banks and assets (1.03e-05); for regional banks, the increase in scale estimates
would be the sum of the coefficient for assets (2.23e-06) and the coefficient of the
interaction term between assets and regional banks (1.91e-05); for city banks, the increase
in scale estimates would be just the coefficient on assets. The second model estimates
economies of density as a function of the same variables and finds similar results.
The relationship between size and efficiency is not surprising. Density economies are
more likely to be exhausted on the margin for larger banks because larger banks
process more transactions than smaller banks precisely because they are larger, so their
branch network is more likely to have reached capacity, holding the number of branches
fixed[9]. Diseconomies of density may occur because of congestion at branches. For
example, as the demand for loans increases, the resources of the existing branch
facilities and loan officers can become sufficiently strained such that in-depth credit
analyses are not possible; as a result, more bad loans are made, which increases the
input cost of a loan – the loan loss provisions – and lowers returns to density in loans.
Model III Model IV
Parameter estimate Parameter estimate




p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Sales 4.7e-05 5.87e-05
(0.0000) (0.0000)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Trust bank dummy 20.8679 21.0696
(0.2163) (0.2799)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Regional bank dummy 21.1541 21.2297
(0.1599) (0.2069)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Sales * trust bank 1.36e-05 1.45e-05
(0.0000) (0.0000)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Sales * regional bank 5.51e-04 6.56e-04
(0.0000) (0.0000)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Notes: This Table estimates returns to scale as a function of sales, dummy variables for each type of
bank, and interaction terms between sales and bank-type dummy variables (model III) and estimates
returns to density as a function of the same variables (model IV). Parameter estimates for each
coefficient are shown, along with their standard error in parentheses and p-value. The regression
specification provides an alternative method to using the correlations in Table V to determine the
relationship between scale efficiencies/density efficiencies and profitability, within each bank type and
across bank types. Model III: Estimate of returns to scale ¼ aþ b1 (sales) þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3
(regional bank) þ b4 (sales * trust bank) þ b5 (sales * regional bank). Adj R-square: 0.8319. Model IV:
Estimate of returns to density ¼ aþ b1 ðsalesÞ þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3 (regional bank) þ b4 (sales *
trust bank) þ b5 (sales * regional bank). Adj. R-square: 0.7902
Table VII.
Regressions of economies
of scale and density on






Scale economies are more likely to be exhausted on the margin for larger banks for
several reasons. First, larger banks can exhibit managerial diseconomies (discussed in
Williamson (1967), Williamson (1970), and Keren and Levhari (1983)) because they
have more layers of management than smaller banks. Second, the overhead costs for
larger banks for opening up a new branch can be higher for larger banks than smaller
banks. Larger banks often compete on non-price aspects, such as knowledgeability of
staff, and are often located in more metropolitan areas with higher rents. As a result,
the overhead costs and labor costs are higher for larger banks because the branches are
staffed by more skilled employees and are more elaborate. Consequently, the
cost-structure is less favorable for opening a new branch – constant or decreasing
returns to scale – because overhead costs are higher[10]. This is supported by the
summary statistics on PPE per branch, overhead expenses per branch, non-interest
expense per branch, etc. in Table I for larger city banks, which exhibit diseconomies of
scale relative to smaller regional banks.
Smaller regional banks are more likely to be in the increasing returns to density region,
with underutilized networks, than city banks. This may be due to a greater emphasis by
Model V Model VI
Parameter estimate Parameter estimate




p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Net income 21.78e-04 22.42e-04
(0.0001) (0.0001)
p ¼ 0:068 p ¼ 0:045
Trust bank dummy 20.6745 20.7673
(0.3886) (0.4798)
p ¼ 0:086 p ¼ 0:113
Regional bank dummy 20.9918 20.9945
(0.2666) (0.3291)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:003
Net income *trust bank 23.43e-05 5.87e-05
(0.0002) (0.0003)
p ¼ 0:868 p ¼ 0:818
Net income * regional bank 25.19e-05 24.86e-04
(0.0003) (0.0003)
p ¼ 0:046p ¼ 0:129
Notes: This Table estimates returns to scale as a function of net income, dummy variables for each
type of bank, and interaction terms between net income and bank-type dummy variables (model V) and
estimates returns to density as a function of the same variables (model VI). Parameter estimates for
each coefficient are shown, along with their standard error in parentheses and p-value. The regression
specification provides an alternative method to using the correlations in Table V to determine the
relationship between scale/density efficiencies and profitability, within each bank type and across bank
types. Model V: Estimate of returns to scale ¼ aþ b1 (net income) þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3 (regional
bank) þ b4 (net income * trust bank) þ b5 (net income * regional bank). Adj R-square: 0.5103. Model
VI: Estimate of returns to density ¼ aþ b1 (net income) þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3 (regional bank) þ b4
(net income * trust bank) þ b5 (net income * regional bank). Adj. R-square: 0.4433
Table VIII.
Regressions of economies
of scale and density on





regional banks on spatial convenience within their prefecture – “a branch at every
corner”. In addition, some of the regional markets are thinner and generate less volume
than metropolitan markets, in which city banks and trust banks are located. This results
in a dense network of underutilized branches. Although regional banks do not have more
branches than city banks or trust banks, they often have more branches relative to the
volumes that they process, as the summary statistics in tTable 1 on low per branch
volumes for regional banks, relative to city banks and trust banks, indicate[11].
The finding that banks with high sales are more likely to have exploited scale and
density efficiencies is reinforced by the findings in Table VII, which estimate
economies of scale and economies of density, respectively (models III and IV), as a
function of sales, dummy variables for each type of bank, and interaction terms
between the dummy variables for each type of bank and sales[12]. Banks with high
sales are more likely to have exploited scale and density efficiencies because, in order
to achieve high sales, banks may undertake a greater volume of transactions within
their existing branch network, leading to diseconomies of density and branch
congestion. The banks which have higher sales also are more likely to be city banks,
which have high overhead costs for opening up another branch, leading to
diseconomies of scale when the marginal increase in value of the additional
transactions which could be processed by another branch is exceeded by the marginal
cost of opening up a new branch. Hensel (2003), which examined the relationship
between sales and scale/density efficiencies for European banks during 1998-1999,
found similar results.
As was evident in the negative correlations between net income and scale/density in
Table V, banks with high net incomes are more likely to be in the increasing returns
region. This negative relationship is reinforced by the findings in Table VIII, which
estimate economies of scale and economies of density, respectively (model V and model
VI), as a function of net income, dummy variables for each type of bank, and interaction
terms between the dummy variables for each type of bank and net income[13]. In
Table V, the negative relationships were not statistically significant for city banks and
trust banks, although they were for regional banks. Table VIII also indicates that the
relationship between net income and scale/density is not statistically significant for all
types of banks, although the relationship between net income and scale is significant at
the 10 percent level for city banks and regional banks and the relationship between net
income and density is significant at the 5 percent level for city banks. The explanation
for this negative relationship between net income and scale/density may be that the
larger Japanese banks, especially city banks, exhibited diseconomies of scale/density,
and the resulting diseconomies on the cost-side of undertaking more transactions
outweighed the benefit of greater revenue/sales from undertaking more transactions,
leading to lower net incomes (revenue minus costs) for larger banks. This differs from
the finding for European banks during 1998-1999 of Hensel (2003), which found a
positive relationship between net income and scale/density, rather than a negative
relationship. This is because the larger European banks exhibited constant returns to
scale/density, not decreasing returns as the Japanese banks did.
The positive and largely statistically significant correlations between scale/density
estimates, and various measures of size– the value of loans, deposits, investments, and
the number of branches, and employees – for the total sample and for each type of






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and investments going through their branch network, as well as banks with more
branches and more employees, are more likely to be in the constant to decreasing
returns to scale and density region. This is probably because banks with more
branches and employees often have a large volume of transactions going through them
and consequently tend to be more likely to have exhausted further opportunities for
cost efficiencies within their networks, holding the size of the network fixed. Since
these banks also tend to be larger banks with higher overhead costs, the cost of
opening up another branch is higher, which contributes to diseconomies of scale. The
empirical evidence in Tables X-XIV largely reinforce this finding and indicate a
positive and statistically significant relationship between each measure of size and
scale/density[14] (see Tables IX-XIV).
5. Conclusion
This paper examines whether Japanese banks (city banks, trust banks, and regional
banks) exhibited cost efficiencies – economies of scale and economies of density–
within their branch networks, the relationship between various measures of size and
Model VII Model VIII
Parameter estimate Parameter estimate




p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:001
Loans 3.74e-06 4.72e-06
(6.50e-07) (8.77e-07)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Trust bank dummy 20.9413 21.100
(0.2138) (0.2886)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Regional bank dummy 20.9987 21.0223
(0.1607) (0.2170)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Loans * trust bank 1.96e-05 2.09e-05
(3.09e-06) (4.17e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Loans * regional bank 2.42e-05 2.87e-05
(1.74e-06) (2.35e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Notes: This Table estimates returns to scale as a function of loans, dummy variables for each type of
bank, and interaction terms between loans and bank-type dummy variables (model VII) and estimates
returns to density as a function of the same variables (model VIII). Parameter estimates for each
coefficient are shown, along with their standard error in parentheses and p-value. The regression
specification provides an alternative method to using the correlations in Table IX to determine the
relationship between scale efficiencies/density efficiencies and size, within each bank type and across
bank types. Model VII: Estimate of returns to scale ¼ aþ b1 (loans) þ b2(trust bank) þ b3 (regional
bank) þ b4 (loans * trust bank) þ b5 (loans * regional bank). Adj R-square: 0.8891. Model VIII:
Estimate of returns to density ¼ aþ b1 (loans) þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3 (regional bank) þ b4
(loans * trust bank) þ b5 (loans * regional bank). Adj. R-square: 0.8494
Table X.
Regressions of economies







cost efficiencies, and the policy implications of the findings. The study estimates
economies of scale and density in the Japanese banking sector during 1998-1999, at the
beginning of the merger wave between large Japanese banks. Since this merger wave
has not yielded efficiencies, but rather has yielded opportunities for exercise of market
power and for creation of an entity which is “too big to fail,” this analysis sheds light on
whether, at the start of the wave, banks had reason to believe that larger banks were
more efficient than smaller banks in Japan.
Several key results emerge from the analysis. First, the data suggest that city banks,
which tended to merge with each other during the ensuing merger wave, on average,
exhibited significant diseconomies of scale and density at the time that the merger
wave started. Trust banks, on average, exhibited constant returns to scale and
increasing returns to density, and regional banks experienced substantial increasing
returns to scale and density (Table IV). Second, larger banks (as measured by assets,
value of loans, value of deposits, value of investments, number of employees, and
number of branches) were more likely to be in the decreasing returns to scale/density or
constant returns to scale/density region than smaller banks. This finding was
Model IX Model X
Parameter estimate Parameter estimate




p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Deposits 3.71e-06 4.79e-06
(5.11e-07) (6.76e-07)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Trust bank dummy 20.8080 20.9456
(0.1689) (0.2235)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Regional bank dummy 21.0534 21.069
(0.1276) (0.1688)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Deposits * trust bank 1.69e-05 1.82e-05
(2.48e-06) (3.28e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Deposits * regional bank 2.12e-05 2.52e-05
(1.34e-06) (1.78e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Notes: This Table estimates returns to scale as a function of deposits, dummy variables for each type
of bank, and interaction terms between deposits and bank-type dummy variables (model IX) and
estimates returns to density as a function of the same variables (model X). Parameter estimates for
each coefficient are shown, along with their standard error in parentheses and p-value. The regression
specification provides an alternative method to using the correlations in Table IX to determine the
relationship between scale/density efficiencies and size, within each bank type and across bank types.
Model IX: Estimate of returns to scale ¼ aþ b1 (deposits) þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3 (regional bank)
þ b4 (deposits * trust bank) þ b5 (deposits * regional bank). Adj R-square: 0.8891. Model X: Estimate
of returns to density ¼ aþ b1 (deposits) þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3 (regional bank) þ b4 (deposits * trust
bank) þ b5 (deposits * regional bank). Adj. R-square: 0.8494
Table XI.
Regressions of economies






statistically significant within each type of bank (city banks, regional banks, and trust
banks) and across the types of banks. This is consistent with the findings of earlier
studies on the Japanese banking system, as well as other studies on the banking sector
in the US and in Europe. Third, banks with higher sales were more likely to be in the
constant/decreasing returns to density/scale region. This finding was statistically
significant for all three types of banks (city banks, regional banks, and trust banks)
and across the types of banks. Fourth, banks with higher net incomes, however, were
more likely to be in the increasing returns to scale/density region. The relationship was
not significant for trust banks, but it was significant at either the 5 percent level or the
10 percent level for city banks and regional banks.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between size and efficiency suggests that
at the time that the megabank merger wave started, there was little evidence that
bigger banks were more efficient. This, in turn, raises questions concerning the
motivations of the large Japanese city banks in merging and supports the hypothesis
that they may have been seeking opportunities to exercise greater market power or to
Model XI Model XII
Parameter estimate Parameter estimate




p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Investments 1.32e-05 1.66e-05
(2.28e-06) (2.83e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Trust bank dummy 20.8651 21.0525
(0.1951) (0.2421)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Regional bank dummy 21.070 21.1301
(0.1480) (0.1836)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Investments * trust bank 2.64e-05 2.79e-05
(5.80e-06) (7.20e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Investments * regional bank 1.004e-05 1.23e-05
(6.91e-06) (8.57e-06)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Notes: This Table estimates returns to scale as a function of investments, dummy variables for each
type of bank, and interaction terms between investments and bank-type dummy variables (model XI)
and estimates returns to density as a function of the same variables (model XII). Parameter estimates
for each coefficient are shown, along with their standard error in parentheses and p-value. The
regression specification provides an alternative method to using the correlations in Table IX to
determine the relationship between scale/density efficiencies and size, within each bank type and
across bank types. Model XI: Estimate of returns to scale ¼ aþ b1 (investments) þ b2 (trust bank)
þ b3 (regional bank) þ b4 (investments * trust bank) þ b5 (investments * regional bank). Adj
R-square: 0.8894. Model XII: Estimate of returns to density ¼ aþ b1 (investments) þ b2 (trust bank)











create an entity which was “too big to fail”. Indeed, the press at the time was concerned
in many cases that the rationale for efficiency from the mergers was weak, but that the
rationale for greater market power was believable. Subsequent events have shown that
efficiencies have not materialized.
It is not surprising that the mega-mergers were between large city banks, which
were in the diseconomies region in scale/density did not yield efficiencies. Possibly,
mergers between city banks and regional banks (which were in the increasing returns
to scale and density region), or city banks and trust banks (which were in the
constant/increasing returns to scale and density region) would have led to greater
efficiencies in terms of exploitation of efficiencies through more efficient utilization of
underutilzed branch networks.
Mergers between city banks and regional banks may have yielded efficiencies
through greater utilization of underutilized regional banking branch networks. Since
regional banks exhibited increasing returns to density and have low costs for opening
up another branch (as seen in their increasing returns to scale estimates and in the
summary statistics on their low overhead costs), they could take advantage of cost
Model XIII Model XIV
Parameter estimate Parameter estimate




p ¼ 0:025 p ¼ 0:440
Total offices 0.0037 0.0050
(0.0008) (0.0008)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Trust bank dummy 20.4477 20.6796
(0.3514) (0.3757)
p ¼ 0:206 p ¼ 0:074
Regional bank dummy 21.0615 21.0212
(0.2610) (0.2791)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Total offices * trust bank 0.0074 0.0112
(0.0033) (0.0035)
p ¼ 0:025 p ¼ 0:002
Total offices * regional bank 0.0038 0.0044
(0.0009) (0.0010)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Notes: This Table estimates returns to scale as a function of total offices, dummy variables for each
type of bank, and interaction terms between total offices and bank-type dummy variables (model XIII)
and estimates returns to density as a function of the same variables (model XIV). Parameter estimates for
each coefficient are shown, along with their standard error in parentheses and p-value. The regression
specification provides an alternative method to using the correlations in Table IX to determine the
relationship between scale/density efficiencies and size, within each bank type and across bank types.
Model XIII: Estimate of returns to scale ¼ aþ b1 (total offices) þ b2 (trust bank) þ b3 (regional bank)
þ b4 (total offices * trust bank) þ b5 (total offices * regional bank). Adj R-square: 0.8894. Model XIV:
Estimate of returns to density¼ aþ b1 (total offices)þ b2 (trust bank)þ b3 (regional bank)þ b4 (total
offices * trust bank) þ b5 (total offices * regional bank). Adj. R-square: 0.8730
Table XIII.
Regressions of economies






efficiencies by processing more transactions within their existing branch networks.
City banks, on the other hand, had branch networks whose capacity had been exceeded
by the number of transactions processed (as seen in their decreasing returns to density
estimates) and had high overhead costs for opening up another branch (as seen in their
decreasing returns to scale estimates and in the summary statistics on overhead costs).
Since further expansion of the saturated, pre-existing city bank network would be
costly due to the high overhead costs per branch, city banks could merge with regional
banks and enter various prefectures, offering to local companies financial products in
which the regional banks traditionally lacked expertise. The resulting greater number
of transactions and improved utilization of the branch capacity of regional banks may
have yielded cost efficiencies from the merger[15].
Mergers between city banks and trust banks may also have yielded greater
efficiencies through greater utilization of the trust banks’ branch networks because city
banks and trust banks are located in similar geographic areas. Although trust banks
could not have exploited cost efficiencies by opening up additional branches (seen in
Model XVII Model XVIII
Parameter estimate Parameter estimate




p ¼ 0:004 p ¼ 0:548
Employees 1.02e-04 1.34e-04
(0.0000) (0.0000)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Trust bank dummy 21.2879 21.5113
(0.2312) (0.2795)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Regional bank dummy 20.8237 20.7302
(0.1610) (0.1946)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Employees * trust bank 2.95e-04 3.41e-04
(0.0004) (0.0000)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Employees * regional bank 2.30e-04 2.69e-04
(0.0000) (0.0000)
p ¼ 0:000 p ¼ 0:000
Notes: This Table estimates returns to scale as a function of the number of employees, dummy
variables for each type of bank, and interaction terms between employees and bank-type dummy
variables (model XV) and estimates returns to density as a function of the same variables (model XVI).
Parameter estimates for each coefficient are shown, along with their standard error in parentheses and
p-value. The regression specification provides an alternative method to using the correlations in
Table IX to determine the relationship between scale/density efficiencies and size, within each bank
type and across bank types. Model XVII: Estimate of returns to scale ¼ aþ b1 (employees) þ b2
(trust bank) þ b3 (regional bank) þ b4 (employees * trust bank) þ b5 (employees * regional bank).
Adj R-square: 0.9375. Model XVIII: Estimate of returns to density ¼ aþ b1 (employees) þ b2 (trust











their constant returns to scale estimates and in their high overhead costs), they did
have underutilized branch networks (seen in their increasing returns to density
estimates) such that cost efficiencies could be exploited through a merger by using the
underutilized trust bank branch network to process more transactions and to offer new
products.
In conclusion, mergers can play an important role in stimulating the Japanese
economy and in creating stronger, more efficient, and more internationally competitive
financial institutions. In the banking industry, an understanding of the steps necessary
to achieve economies of scale and density within branch networks is key in creating
value-enhancing mergers. This analysis does not refute concerns that issues of market
power rather than improvements in efficiency were the motivating factors behind the
mega- mergers. Nevertheless, efficient usage of branch networks is not a strategic
variable that can be entirely controlled by management, since the volume of
transactions undertaken within the network is dependent on demand-side factors, such
as the confidence of the public in the banking system. While managers do have the
ability to choose types of consolidation which have the potential for improving
efficiency, economic and financial reforms enacted by the government to strengthen
confidence in the financial system are also key in developing an efficient and
internationally competitive banking sector.
Notes
1. Banks and companies have historically been closely linked together through the main bank
system, in which a particular bank and associated banks are the principal lenders to
networks of companies (keiretsus) and hold shares in them as a corporate governance
mechanism – a topic which is thoroughly dealt with in Hoshi et al. (1990) and Kester (1991).
2. Regional banks, despite their aggregate low value of deposits (and deposits on a per branch
basis), have the lowest interest expense per deposit (price of deposits); city banks and trust
banks have much higher interest expense per deposit. City banks, whose aggregate value of
loans is between that of trust banks and regional banks and whose loans per branch are the
highest, have the lowest loan loss provision per loan (the lowest price of loans), closely
followed by regional banks. Regional banks have had less exposure to defaulting loans
because they have had fewer corporate customers and they have the smallest value of loans
per branch, which is why their price of loans is so low. City banks, on the other hand, may
have a low price of loans because they may have a learning curve in loan issuance – as the
banks issues more loans, their average cost of “producing” loans would fall since they issue
loans in sufficient quantities that they become better at identifying good credit risks from
bad credit risks. Not adjusting for the number of branches, interest expense was 46 times
greater at city banks than at regional banks (eleven times greater at trust banks relative to
regional banks) and the loan loss provisions are 14 times greater at city banks relative to
regional banks and six-and-a-half times greater at trust banks relative to regional banks.
3. Not surprisingly, due to the high value of loans and investments per branch, city banks and
trust banks have interest income per branch which is about seven times greater than at
regional banks.
4. Trust banks have the highest non-interest expense per branch, followed by city banks;
regional banks’ non-interest expense per branch is about one-sixth that of trust banks and
about a quarter of that of city banks. Not adjusting for the number of branches, non-interest
expenses are 13 times greater for city banks than regional banks and three-and-a-half times




5. A more detailed discussion of the evolution of the use of the translog functional form in scale
estimation can be found in Goddard et al. (2001).
6. The “adding-up” condition is that the cost shares of the inputs should sum to one, where the
cost share of an input is defined as the costs attributed to that input as a fraction of total cost.
The sum of the costs attributed to each input equals total cost. The specification of the cost
share equations requires a number of cross-equation coefficient constraints because the
coefficients in the cost share equations are the same as the coefficients on some of the terms
in the main translog cost function. In addition, some of the coefficients on the cost share
equation of one input are constrained to be the same as the coefficients on the cost share
equation for another input. This is because the “adding up” restriction that the shares must
add to one results in singular residual cross products and disturbance covariance matrices.
The singularity of these matrices is rooted in the fact that the disturbances for each
observation across equations must add to zero, since the shares must add to one, and M-1 of
the M share equations are linearly independent. Prior to taking natural logarithms, each
variable is divided by its mean such that these modified variables are zero when evaluated at
their mean (see Caves et al., 1984).
7. The likelihood ratio test between the unrestricted model including investments and the
restricted model without investments also confirmed the importance of inclusion of
investments – Chi2(9) was 25.23 with a p-value of 0.0027.
8. The dual input and output nature of deposits is discussed in Berger and Humphrey (1997).
Furthermore, other studies discussing the advantages of the value-added approach include
Berger and Humphrey (1992).
9. The reasons for diminishing returns to density within a given branch network include
diminishing returns in the ability to further spread the fixed costs of production over the
large volumes of output, as well as diminishing returns in the ability of labor to specialize
Scherer and Ross (1990).
10. This is because if the marginal increase in total physical costs across branches from opening
a new branch exceeds the marginal increase in transactions undertaken by that branch, then
average cost per unit of output rises, although quantity rises-such that the slope of the
average cost curve connecting the points is positive and the firm is in the diseconomies
region.
11. The concept of underutilization or “under-production” of the smaller, more numerous
regional banks relative to the larger, less numerous city and trust banks is consistent with
the non-appropriability of social surplus effect, discussed in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
Spence (1976), which suggests that monopolistically competitive competition results in “the
existing firms producing too little to exhaust returns to scale” (Tirole, 1997).
12. Again, both regressions exhibit statistical significance (evident in the p-values) for all terms,
including bank dummies and interaction terms. For example, the specification for model III
in Table VII indicates a positive and statistically significant relation between sales and
economies of scale for all three types of banks. For trust banks, an increase in sales by 1 unit
increases the scale estimates by the sum of the coefficient for sales (4.7e-05) and the
coefficient for the interaction term (1.36e-05) between trust banks and sales; for regional
banks, its the sum of the coefficient for sales (4.7e-05) and the coefficient of the interaction
term between sales and regional banks (5.51e-04); for city banks, its just the coefficient on
sales. A similarly positive and statistically significant relationship can be seen between sales
and economies of density in model IV.
13. In Table VIII, for model V, the relationship between scale and net income is negative for city
banks (coefficient on net income is 21.78e-04), negative for trust banks (sum of 21.78e-04
and 23.43e-05), and negative for regional banks (sum of 21.78e-04 and 25.19e-05). For





(coefficient on net income is 22.42e-04), negative for trust banks (sum of 22.42e-04 and the
coefficient on interaction term, which is 5.87e-05), and negative for regional banks (sum of
22.42e-04 and the coefficient on the interaction term between regional banks and net
income, which is 24.86e-04).
14. For example, the specification in model VII in Table X indicates a positive relation between
loans and scale for all three types of banks – for trust banks, an increase in the value of loans
by 1 unit increases the scale estimates by the sum of the coefficient for loans (3.74e-06) and
the coefficient for the interaction term (1.96e-05); for regional banks, it’s the sum of the
coefficient for loans (3.74e-06) and the coefficient of the interaction term between loans and
regional banks (2.42e-05); for city banks, its just the coefficient on loans. Model VIII in
Table X confirms the positive and statistically significant relation between density and loans
for each type of bank: for trust banks, the sum of the coefficient on loans and the coefficient
on the interaction term between trust banks and loans is positive; for regional banks, the sum
of the coefficient on loans and the coefficient on the interaction term between regional banks
and loans is positive; for city banks, the coefficient on loans is positive. All of the coefficients
in both Tables are statistically significant.
15. Large Japanese city banks which have limited opportunities to exploit cost efficiencies
through further expansion of their branch networks, or through greater utilization of their
networks have another alternative – expanding online, which is a lower cost distribution
channel. US evidence has suggested that branch banking costs on a per transaction basis are
$1.07, while internet banking costs on a per transaction basis are $0.01 (DeYoung, 2001)
During 1999-2000, some of the larger city banks followed this strategy. For example, Bank of
Tokyo Mitsubishi, which exhibited the most significant diseconomies of scale and density in
the sample expanded online and had 138,000 retail banking customers by mid-2000 (EIU,
2000) Sanwa Bank, second from last in the magnitude of diseconomies of scale and density
exhibited, launched e-Wing Securities (EIU, 2000). Sakura Bank, fourth from last in the
sample in terms of diseconomies of scale and third from last in diseconomies of density,
developed an online bank, Japan Net Bank, along with Fujitsu, Japan’s largest computer
manufacturer, in addition to developing an ATM network in convenience stores (EIU, 1999,
2000) Fuji Bank launched Fuji Cyberbank, the online unit of the new Mizuho Financial Group
(Fuji Bank, Industrial Japan Bank of Japan, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank).
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